

Executive Registry

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18 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Interagency Memorandum: Turkey After
the US Arms Cutoff

1. This is a draft interagency memorandum on Turkey. It was cabled yesterday to [] who, as good fortune has it, is in [] today and tomorrow. [] will be forwarding comments and I expect to get further remarks from others. If you have a chance to scan this draft, we would profit from your reaction as well.

2. We are planning to place an inventory [] which was prepared recently by the IC Staff, at Annex. We are also preparing a map to show where the intelligence facilities are.

3. Target publication date is Friday; if we meet that target, I'd suggest that the NID carry portions of the memorandum sometime next week.

[]
Acting National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

CC: DDCI
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18 February 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Interagency Memorandum: Turkey After
the US Arms Cutoff

1. Herewith a revised draft which takes into account the many useful suggestions that came out at our meeting Friday afternoon. This draft was cabled to [] yesterday; we asked that he forward comments [] before COB, 19 February.

2. Please review the new draft at your earliest convenience and let us have your views by telephone by 1500 on 19 February. We will then decide whether another meeting is needed. Our conference room has been reserved for Thursday morning, in case it is.

[]

Acting National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

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



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
NOTE	i
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS	1
I. TURKEY'S DEPENDENCE ON US MILITARY EQUIPMENT.	3
Impact of US Aid Cutoff.....	4
Spare Parts	4
Interpretation of Force Modernization Program	5
II. OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPLY	5
Reliance on Domestic Production	6
Arms From Other NATO Members	7
From Russia?	12
III. WHEN THE TURKS REACT	13
Impact on US-Turkish Relations	13
Turkey, Europe, and NATO	15
Relations Between Turkey and Greece	17
Turkey and Cyprus	18
Looking Around For Friends	18

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Draft Interagency Memorandum

Subject: Turkey After the US Arms Cutoff

NOTE

It is too early to predict with much confidence precisely how Turkey will behave in reaction to the cutoff of US military aid. Indeed, it seems clear that the Turks themselves are just beginning to address the problem, largely because -- until now -- the prospect of such a cutoff has been for them something unthinkable.

As Turkey searches for a way out of the dilemma, however, we can identify some of the factors that will weigh heavily in Turkish calculations. These factors may provide useful clues with respect to the options open to Ankara and to how these impinge on US interests. The degree of Turkish dependence on US arms aid, the likely outcome of the inevitable search for alternate sources of military equipment, and the durability of Turkey's present orientation toward the West are some of the issues addressed in what follows.

For purposes of this paper, an indefinite cutoff of US military assistance is assumed.

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THE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

The Turks have no satisfactory alternative to US supply of arms, at least over the near term. Hence, the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces and their ability to perform their key role in NATO have been weakened. At the same time, the cut-off of US arms aid will act as a constraint on Turkey to avoid provoking the Greeks in such a way as to risk involvement in a protracted military conflict.

It is highly likely that the Turks will retaliate against the US --

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This could seriously weaken the ability of US forces to operate in the area and jeopardize key intelligence collection programs.

Turkey's ties with NATO will also be damaged, but probably not as seriously as Turkish relations with the US. For at least the short term, much will depend on whether Turkey is successful in obtaining military equipment from other NATO countries. If the latter are able to help Ankara in this way, moderate forces in Turkey will be strengthened and the country's political and economic ties to Western Europe will probably remain strong.

If, on the other hand, the Turks conclude that their basic military needs cannot be met by their European allies, Ankara

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will seek alternative sources of arms and arms financing in Middle Eastern countries and perhaps the USSR. These alternatives would have serious drawbacks for the Turks. The Turkish military, in particular, would be most reluctant to take a definitive turn away from Europe and to make Turkey dependent on the Arabs, Iran, or the Soviets for arms.

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